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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
youth is stigmatized as a "criminal" because he has been found to
be a delinquent, or (3) burden the juvenile courts with a proce-
dural requirement which will make juvenile adjudications signifi-
candy more time consuming or rigid.17
The cautious manner in which the Court is proceeding into the area
of juvenile rights at hearings indicates that it recognizes the beneficial
aspects of the present juvenile court system as well as its need for im-
provement. The Couri seems determined to preserve those aspects of
the juvenile hearing which it considers necessary for rehabilitation while
at the same time providing the safeguards of criminal procedure which
it considers essential to due process.
DENNIS L. BECK
Products Liability-BREACH-OF WARRANTY-DANGER INViTEs RES-
cu.. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d
173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
Plaintiffs in this case were employees, and the survivors of employees
of the New York City Bureau of Sewage Disposal who had been in-
jured or killed in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue John J. Rooney'
from a sewer tunnel filled with lethal hydrogen sulfide gas. Rooney
was suffocating and in need of aid because of a defect in the gas mask
he was wearing in the tunnel.2 The mask had been manufactured by
the defendant.
The rescuers or their survivors sought damages for wrongful death
and personal injuries. The trial court found the manufacturer liable;
the Appellate Division' and Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.4
The Court of Appeals held the manufacturer liable to the rescuers under
17. 90 S. Ct. at 1078.
1. Rooney's estate recovered in a previous action for wrongful death. Rooney v.
S. A. Healy Co., 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383, 281 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967).
2. Rooney was wearing a used mask. Id. at 46, 228 N.E.2d at 386, 281 N.Y.S.2d at
325. See Kaufman v. Katz, 356 Mich. 354, 97 N.W.2d 56 (1959); UNIFORM COMMCIAL
CODE § 2-314, Comment 3. Contra Holley v. Central Auto Parts, 347 S.W.2d 341
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (the court held that the doctrine of implied warranty does not
extend to used goods).
S. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 255, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639
(1969).
4. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S2d 942 (1969) (the actions of all the rescuers were consolidated).
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the "danger invites rescue" doctrine5 because the danger which resulted
in the injuries and deaths was created by the defendant's breach of war-
ranty.6
Historically, liability for breach of warranty required privity of con-
tract.7 This requirement, however, is being abolished by an increasing
number of courts. In the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.," the New Jersey Supreme Court found the manufacturer
of a new car liable for personal injuries to the wife of the purchaser
sustained as a result of a defective steering mechanism. The court held
that regardless of privity, an implied warranty of merchantability from
the manufacturer and dealer extended to the purchaser, members of his
family, other persons occupying the car, and users.9 After Henningsen,
the privity requirements for breach of warranty actions were eliminated
in a number of states. 10 The manufacturer's liability was extended to
purchasers and users on the basis of breach of implied warranty, liability
in tort,'- or a combination of the two.'2
5. The "danger invites rescue" doctrine permits an injured rescuer to recover damages
when, as a result of defendant's negligence, an emergency situation was created which
imperiled his life or the lives of others. The doctrine allows a rescuer to recover
regardless of contributory negligence, as long as he did not act in a reckless manner.
"Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.... The wrong
that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer."
Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180, 133 N.E. 437 (1921). See Eckert v.
Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
6. 25 N.Y.2d at 465, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46.
7. See, e.g., Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935).
8. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9. 161 A.2d at 100 The Henningsen court gave the following reasons for extending
liability:
Accordingly, we hold that under modern marketing conditions, when a
manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes
its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable
for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser.
161 A.2d at 84. See also 75 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1961).
10. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d
182 (1965); Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54
(1965). See also 2 L. FRumER & M. FRIEDmAN, PRODUCT LTAn-Liy § 16.0412][b] (1966)
for a state by state analysis.
11. See, e.g., Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)
citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoins) oF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), which
states:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer is subject to liability for physical harm
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In New York, the effect of Henningsen was apparent in Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp.13 There the court held the manufacturer
of an airplane containing a defective altimeter liable to the passenger's
parents in an action for wrongful death on the combined theories of
breach of implied warranty and strict liability. 14 Neither Henningsen
nor Goldberg, however, extended protection to bystanders or other
persons affected by the defect.
Protection to third parties was first extended in Piercefield v. Reming-
ton Arms Co.,'5 in which the Supreme Court of Michigan allowed a
bystander to recover damages for personal injuries from the manufac-
turer for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability."6 The court
reasoned that the manufacturer is in the best position to correct defects
which endanger the public. 17 Subsequent decisions extending the lia-
bility of the manufacturer to bystanders have been based on implied
breach of warranty,18 strict liability in tort,19 or a combination of both.20
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
12. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
13. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
14. "A breach of warranty . . . is not only a violation of the sales contract out of
which the warranty arises, but is a tortious wrong ..... " Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82,
240 N.Y.S.2d at 594. The court refused to hold defendant Kollsman liable because
the assembler's liability provided "adequate protection" to the passengers even though
Kollsman manufactured the defective altimeter and Lockheed merely installed it in its
plane. Id. at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
15. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (plaintiff's injuries were caused by a
defective shotgun shell).
16. 133 N.W.2d at 136.
17. 133 N.W.2d at 134.
18. See Speed Fasteners, Inc.,v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967).
19. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969);
Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); Darryl v. Ford
Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). See also Note, Strict Products Liability and
the Bystander, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 916 (1964).
20. See Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966);
Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
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The facts of the instant case caused the court no difficulty in accepting
breach of warranty as the basis for its decision. The result might be
otherwise, however, in a different fact situation because of certain incon-
gruities between breach of warranty and tort liability. The Uniform
Commercial Code requires an injured party to give notice of a breach
of warranty within a reasonable time after learning of the breach before
damages may be recovered.21 Under tort theory, however, notice of a
breach is not required.22 The Code allows disclaimer of any warranty,
express or implied, by use of appropriate language,2 but because dis-
claimer is a contract device, it is not a valid defense in a tort action.24
The U. C. C. usually requires a "sale" of the defective goods, 25 but no
sale is required under tort law for liability to attach.2  Furthermore,
under the Code the statute of limitations for breach of warranty actions
is four years,27 and the period is computed from the time the breach oc-
curs which is most often "when tender of delivery is made." 28 Statu-
tory periods for tort actions are generally shorter than the four year
Code limitation, and a tort cause of action accrues when the injury
occurs,2 9 not when the goods are tendered.
The Guarino decision represents a developing trend of extending
liability to include bystanders who are affected by defective goods.20
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607 (3) (a).
22. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
* 23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
24. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile disclaimer held no defense to strict liability). See
generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791, 831 (1966). See also 2 L. FRuMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note 9,
S 16A[5][e] (1966).
25. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 NE.2d 792 (1954).
26. See, e.g., Schenfield v. Norton Co., 391 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1968). RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
27. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(1). See Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas
Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1965).
28. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(2). Under the majority view, the statute
begins to run from the time of tender. See, e.g., Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa.
107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965).
29. See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 147 (3rd ed.
1964).
30. Some states have extended liability to persons affected by the goods by adopting
anti-privity statutes.
Lack of privity ... shall be no defense . . . for breach of warranty
if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might
reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1965). See generally Speidel, The Virginia
1970]
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In so holding, the Court of Appeals believed that the theory of the
action, whether breach of warranty or negligence, was unimportant in
a "danger invites rescue" situation. 31 Previous litigation and the sig-
nificantly different bases of liability, however, indicate that some dis-
tinction between warranty and tort theory is desirable. 2 Indeed, some
members of this court cautioned that the holding should be limited to
similar factual settings as were present in Guarino lest injustice result
from abuse of the remedy of breach of warranty.33
WILLIAM M. MUSSER, III
Taxation-STocm REDEMPTIONS-THE AVAILABILITY OF CAPITAL
GAINS TREATMENT. United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041 (1970).
Maclin Davis, a fifty percent stockholder in a closely held corporation,'
made an additional capital contribution in exchange for preferred stock
to enable the corporation to qualify for a loan. 2 The stock was redeemed
"Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965).
31. 25 N.Y.2d at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
32. The trend toward abolishing privity in warranty actions is gaining support. See
supra note 10. As a result, the word "warranty" is no longer identified with contract
law but has taken on many aspects of tort law. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS
S 402A, comment m at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). However, the new meaning of
"warranty" causes a conflict between section 402A of the Restatement and the warranty
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The question arises when to apply
section 402A and when to apply the Code. Does section 402A apply to all warranty
actions or only certain types such as personal injury cases? It is this conflict which
prompted Chief Justice Traynor to criticize the New Jersey Supreme Court for allowing
a plaintiff to recover damages for loss of bargain on the basis of strict tort liability
under section 402A of the Restatement in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). The California court stated:
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was
designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of
the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather to govern the distinct problem
of physical injuries.
403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21. However, Justice Peters in a strong dissent
reasoned that if a defect exists, recovery should not be based on what kind of damage
the defect caused. 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25. See generally R. D. DUESENBERG
& L. KING, SALEs "D BULK TRANSACnONS UNDER U.C.C., § 7.0611] (1966).
33. 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (Scileppi, J., concurring).
1. Davis and his wife each owned twenty-five percent of the issued common stock.
2. The company believed that it needed to present a better position on the balance
sheet for the purposes of loan qualification. Once the anticipated loan was repaid, Davis
was to be reimbursed via the redemption of the preferred stock.
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